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I. INTRODUCTION
Carlos Fuentes reminded the 1983 Harvard commencement that "the
clocks of all men and women, of all civilizations, are not set at the same
hour."' The Mexican writer warned of the dangers in forcing United
States standards, born of a unique set of circumstances and development,
onto Mexico, a nation that operates from a different economic, political,
and historical perspective.2 For 150 years, Mexico has felt threatened by
the United States and, in a real sense, Mexico's self-image is defined in
opposition to the colossus to the north. In 1847, the United States Army
overran Mexico City and forced Mexico to renounce all claims to Texas
and to sell what is now California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and New
Mexico to the United States for a mere $15 million? In addition to
armed invasions and political interference by the United States
government, businessmen from the north earned a reputation for
exploiting Mexican resources and hampering Mexican development.4
Mexico perceives its history and condition as being largely created by the
actions, policies, and pressures of the United States.
In an effort to repel continued domination by the United States, the
Mexican Constitution of 1917 was amended to curtail foreign
involvement, ownership, and investment in the country.' This led to the
nationalization of industry and to a protectionist and isolationist stance
that has characterized Mexico until very recently. Mexico's foreign
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1. CARLOS FUENTES, A Harvard Commencement, in MYSELF WITH OTHERS: SELECTED
ESSAYS 199, 199 (1988).
2. Id. at 200-01.
3. ROBERT RYAL MILLER, MEXIco: A HISTORY 229 (1985). All references to currency are
in United States dollars.
4. See id. at 266-78.
5. MEX. CONST. art. 27, paras. 9-11 (as amended Jan. 6, 1960); MILLER, supra note 3, at
306. Mexico's decisive loss in the Mexican-American War constituted "a psychological blow
that shattered the nation's honor and dignity. In addition, it engendered a deep feeling of
'yankeephobia' that still persists, openly as well as below the surface." Id. at 229.
6. Jesus Silva & Richard K. Dunn, A Free Trade Agreenent Between the United States and
Mexico: The Right Choice?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 937, 945-53 (1990).
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policy has opposed the capitalist free market approach of the United
States and has served as an irritant between the two nations.7
The disparity in the development of these two countries, coupled
with a history of distrust, friction, and violent conflict, seems an
inauspicious context for significant free market economic cooperation.
However, despite their complex relationship, the United States and
Mexico are deeply entwined economically. Mexico is the third largest
trading partner of the United States.8 In 1989, the United States
accounted for 62 percent of all foreign direct investment in Mexico,
totalling an estimated $7.1 billion.9 In 1990, total United States-Mexico
trade reached a record $59 billion.10 Last year alone, United States
exports to Mexico were worth $28.4 billion, including $2.5 billion in
agricultural products, $3 billion in consumer goods, and $9.5 billion in
capital goods."
The changing realities of the global marketplace have spurred
flexibility in the United States and reforms in Mexico. The increasing
economic dominance of Japan and the economic integration of Europe,
the Pacific Rim, and Latin America present formidable concerns for the
United States. Meanwhile, Mexico has undertaken substantial reform in
the last few years to liberalize trade and investment restrictions to attract
more business. Since 1985, Mexico has lowered its average tariff rate to
10 percent, reduced inflation from 100 percent to 15-20 percent,
privatized many state-owned companies, repealed some restrictions on
foreign investment, and eliminated many nontariff trade barriers. 2
This more attractive Mexican commercial climate, in concert with the
United States' competitive concerns, tilled the ground for a trilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFITA) between Mexico, the
United States, and Canada. 3
The plan is not without its opponents, however, and popular
criticism of NAFTA is growing in Mexico and the United States. In
Mexico, critics argue that American economic domination will return.
14
7. See ALAN RIDING, DISTANT NEIGHBORS: A PORTRAIT OF THE MEXICANS 319 (1984).
8. Christopher Cox, Free Trade: An Orange County Opportunity, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992,
at B9.
9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
GENERATING JOBS FOR AMERICANS 7-8 (Update May 1991) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE UPDATE].
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Tom Brown, Mosbacher Predicts Huge Increase in U.S.-Mexico Trade, Reuters, Mar. 30,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
13. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REVIEW OF U.S.-
MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, Executive Summary 2 (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW].
14. See Andrew LePage, Critics Blast U.S.-Mexico Plan on Environment, SAN DIEGO BUS. J.,
Sept. 30, 1991, at 3.
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In the United States, much of the controversy concerns the two nations'
disparate environmental standards and differing levels of environmental
regulatory enforcement. A primary consideration pertains to the
potential increase of imported goods into the United States that are
subject to less stringent health and safety standards than those that apply
within the United States.' In addition, environmentalists fear that
increased industrial activity will worsen Mexico's air and water
contamination and, as a result, will increase the amount of pollution
coming into the United States. 6 Critics feel that these environmental
considerations are being supplanted by the fervor to establish a free
trade agreement. In the rush to conclude economic negotiations, they
argue that long-term environmental safeguards should not be
forgotten.'
7
This article examines the potential environmental consequences of
NAFTA and proposes ways of addressing the concerns. Part II describes
the structure, scope, and aims of NAFTA. Part M sets out the potential
environmental consequences of the Free Trade Agreement, including a
discussion of maquiladora industries which are central to the United
States-Mexican commercial relationship. Part IV provides an overview
of the Mexican environmental regime, and Part V explores proposed
solutions to perceived detrimental environmental consequences of the
Agreement. This analysis affords practical insights into approaching the
vexing issues of regulatory harmonization, enforcement, and funding in
the context of the United States-Mexican economic and environmental
relationship.
II. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Background to the Negotiations
The worldwide economic and political changes of the 1980s have
spurred the United States to take aggressive economic action. In
particular, United States officials and business leaders have grown
alarmed at the formation of regional trade blocks' These trade
15. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 70.
16. Id. at 69.
17. TEXAS CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES, A RESPONSE TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PLAN OR FREE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH MEXICO 2 (1991)
[hereinafter TCPS RESPONSE].
18. See Experiences Learned from U.S.-Canada F.T.A. Will Help Talks with Mexico, Official Says,
8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 121, 122 (Jan. 23, 1991). For example, the European
Community (EC), consisting of twelve member nations, is currently engaged in a process of
economic integration that is scheduled for completion at the end of 1992. Michael Scott Feeley
& Peter M. Gilhuly, Green Law Making: A Primer on the European Community's Environmental
Legislative Process, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 654 (1991). The integration will establish a
common market for the EC's 342 million inhabitants. Id. It is the largest market in the world,
262 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
alliances, combined with the Japanese trade challenge and economic
competition from the nascent markets of Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union, convinced the United States to forge a free trade zone for
its own continent. 9
Mexico, however, has been historically cool to any arrangement that
might lead to the economic dominance of the United States within
Mexican borders." This posture has changed as the economic situation
of the country has become critical. Mexico is struggling with a massive
foreign debt, the inability to obtain further loans, and a burgeoning
population needing jobs.2 ' Unemployment in 1990 stood at an
estimated 15 to 18 percent and President Salinas' administration has
experienced difficulty in obtaining loan assistance.22 As a result, the
government is making radical departures from its traditional
protectionist policies in order to increase the nation's prosperity.
After the collapse of oil prices in 1981, Mexico began to seek out
foreign investment.2 President Salinas initially concentrated on
attracting the European and Japanese capital markets, but met with little
success.' In the summer of 1990, Mexico and the United States agreed
to explore the possibility of a free trade agreement involving the three
North American nations. On September 25, 1990, President Bush
notified Congress of his decision to begin free trade negotiations with
Mexico, and on February 5, 1991, Presidents Bush and Salinas, and
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced their intention to
enter a trilateral free trade agreement.' On May 23 of that year, the
United States House of Representatives voted 231 to 192 to extend until
June 1, 1993 President Bush's authority to negotiate NAFTA under the
fast-track rules.'
with some $4 trillion in output, and it will constitute the United States' largest trading partner.
Id.
The EC, however, is not the only threat to the vitality of United States trade. The Pacific
Rim nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, for example, make
up ASEAN. Association of South East Asian Nations Declaration, 6 I.L.M. 1233 (1967). Brunei
joined in 1984. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, ASIA YEARBOOK 1989, at 90 (1989). In addition,
the Latin American Integration Association unites Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Treaty of Montevideo Establishing
the Latin-American Integration Association, Mar. 18, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 672 (1981).
19. Silva & Dunn, supra note 6, at 941-42.
20. See id. at 945. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
21. Jerry Seper, 85t an Hour Feeds Family, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 1990, at B8. Mexico is
a developing nation whose population climbed to 85 million in 1989 and is growing at a rate
of 1.5 million per year. It will reach an estimated 100 million by the year 2000. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE UPDATE, supra note 9, at 8.
22. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 1991, at 205 (1991).
23. RIDING, supra note 7, at 64.
24. Silva & Dunn, supra note 6, at 944.
25. Peter Truell, U.S., Canada and Mexico to Negotiate a North American Free-Trade Pact,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1991, at A7.
26. Congress created fast-track procedures as a vehicle for trade negotiations, recognizing
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B. NAFrA
The main goal of the proposed free trade agreement is to promote
economic growth through expanded trade and investment by allowing
for a staged elimination of barriers to the flow of goods and
investment.' Additionally, the United States intends to achieve a
liberalization of services, including data processing, communications,
banking, finance, and medical services; adopt regulations limiting
benefits of NAFrA to signatory nations; eliminate nontariff barriers, such
as restrictions on domestic content of products assembled in the three
nations; and remove regulations and controls in the automobile
manufacturing industry' As envisioned by the United States, NAFTA
would create the largest market in the world, consisting of over 360
million consumers and a 6 -trillion dollar output.' The free trade
negotiations are being held without the actual proposed terms of the
agreement being made public.
The types of provisions that are being discussed include provisions
for the rapid elimination of tariffs, quotas, and licensing barriers; the
reduction or elimination of Mexican restrictions on foreign ownership;
competition by United States companies against Mexican state-owned or
heavily regulated industries; the elimination of "production
requirements" on goods produced in Mexico, which restrict how
manufacturers may buy materials and sell their finished products; the
promulgation of uniform laws on intellectual property rights
enforcement; the establishment of workable "rules of origin"
requirements to protect the United States and Canada from competition
by non-NAFrA countries taking advantage of Mexico's free trade status;
and the inclusion of President Salinas' free market decrees within
that delicate negotiations between heads of state can be undermined by congressional input and
revision prior to adoption. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE UPDATE, supra note 9, at 15. While
fast-track ensures Congress meaningful participation during the negotiations and a vote on
implementing legislation within a fixed time period, the procedure denies Congress the ability
to amend the agreement prior to adoption. Id. The fast-track procedures are located at 19
U.S.C. § 2191 (1988).
A senior trade official recently reported that progress on the NAFTA negotiations may
slow down due to lack of resources stemming from the intensification of the Uruguay Round
of the GATT negotiations. International Trade, Uruguay Round May Slow Progress on NAFTA Pact,
Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 206, at A-13 (Oct. 24, 1991). Furthermore, the official stated
that no timetable has been set for completing the NAFTA talks. Id. This information supports
the view expressed by Representative Jim Kolbe that the Bush administration will delay
NAFTA because of the political climate going into the presidential elections. Kolbe Believes
Administration Will Delay NAFTA Because of Election-Year Politics, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
46, at 1695 (Nov. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Administration Delay].
27. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE UPDATE, supra note 9, at 3.
28. Summary: Free Trade Agreement Negotiations & Related Developments, October 11-
November 1, SourceMex (Nov. 6, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SrcMex File.
29. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE UPDATE, supra note 9, at v. This is a market 20 percent
larger than that of the European Community. Id.
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NAFTA to prevent subsequent Mexican administrations from
overturning these reforms.' Many of these provisions apparently have
already been worked out?1
C. The Border Plan
NAFTA, however, remains silent on environmental issues. To deflect
criticism of this omission, the Bush and Salinas administrations are
relying on a separate and distinct environmental plan for the boundary
zone between the two countries. 2 At the behest of Presidents Bush and
Salinas, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Mexican Ministry for Urban Development and Ecology (SEDUE)
have been meeting since December of 1990 to develop a
"'comprehensive" border plan (Border Plan) aimed at solving the
pollution problems in the border area. =
Based largely on the La Paz Agreement,M the Border Plan is divided
into several stages. For the first stage (1992-94), the objectives are to
deliniate the environmental characteristics of the area and describe the
current state of the area's major environmental issues.' The parties will
also outline the "cooperative border environmental accomplishments.
. .by binational, national, state, and local environmental agencies."'
Further, the plan should establish priorities and develop mechanisms for
mobilizing the joint efforts of the governmental and nongovernmental
sectors in seeking solutions to the border area's environmental
problemsY
30. See Wesley Smith, Guidelines for U.S. Negotiators at the Trade Talks with Mexico, Heritage
Foundation Rep., Oct. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File [hereinafter
Guidelines].
31. One issue remaining is the coverage of a dispute-resolution mechanism which has
become important to both sides in the wake of a recent GATT panel ruling on the United States
tuna embargo. Nancy Dunne, Political Worries May Force Bush to Delay NAFTA Deal, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 1991, at 9. For a discussion of the GAIT decision and its impact on free trade, see
infra note 82 and accompanying text. For a more detailed treatment of the GATT decision and
the Marine Mammal Protection Act, see David J. Ross, Note, Making GATT Dolphin-Safe: Trade
and the Environment, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 345 (1992).
32. Michael Scott Feeley, The New Border Plan: Will it Appease NAFTA's Critics?, SONREEL
Newsletter (forthcoming May, 1992) (on file with author).
33. U.S. ENVIRONmENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Er AL., INTEGRATED ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN
FOR THE U.S.-MExIcO BORDER AREA I-i (working draft, Aug. 1, 1991) [hereinafter IEP DRAFT].
The border area is defined as "an area 100 km on each side of the [U.S.-Mexican] international
boundary." Id.
34. Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, Aug.
14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., 22 IL.M. 1025 (1983) [hereinafter La Paz Agreement]. For a discussion of
the La Paz Agreement, see infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
35. IEP DRA', supra note 33, at I-.
36. Id. at 1-2.
37. Id.
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Although the Border Plan attempts to cover a wide range of
environmental problems, many of the implementation strategies rely on
the cooperative efforts of the SEDUE and the EPA to develop concrete
solutions for the problems they identify.' There is little practical
discussion in the Border Plan, however, on how to implement its
goals.39 Moreover, the Border Plan points out that a lack of funding
has hampered Mexico's enforcement efforts.4
In response to these concerns, the Secretary of SEDUE announced on
October 28,1991, a $460 million commitment to protect the environment
in the border area4' and asserted that "no new domestic or foreign
investment project will be accepted if it does not fully comply with the
environmental protection criteria" set out by SEDUE.' The SEDUE
border investment package includes investment in sewage and solid
waste systems and waste water treatment plants, as well as road
construction and public transportation.3 Enforcement of environmental
laws will also be strengthened along the border by a team of two
hundred SEDUE inspectors, a two-fold increase from 1991." In
addition, SEDUE plans to equip all of its border work stations with
computers and data banks to expedite intra-agency communication.'
Opponents in the United States are unsatisfied, however, and they
criticize the Border Plan as being one that "plans to plan .. .. "' Many
have also noted that the plan lacks any mention of increased funding,
and that it fails to target specific areas of environmental protection and
enforcement for the necessary funds.4'
Several members of Congress who voted to extend fast-track
authority for NAFTA are criticizing the draft Border Plan for these same
reasons. As of November, 1991, forty members of Congress who voted
38. See id. at 1-5.
39. The Natural Resources Defense Council notes that "[t]he draft's chapter on
'implementation' offers various nebulous commitments, with scant detail of how and when
environmental protection will be accomplished." Justin R. Ward, Environmental Protection in the
North American Free Trade Agreement, Statement of the Natural Resources Defense Council,
Presented in Connection with the Hearings Before the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
Washington, D.C., 7 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter NRDC Statement].
40. IEP DRAFT, supra note 33, at IV-2.
41. Government Announces Plan to Protect Environment Along U.S.-Mexico Border, 14 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 594 (Nov. 6, 1991).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Economist Proposes that NAFTA Include Trinational Superfiindfor Environment, Daily Rep.
for Execs., (BNA) No. 212, at A2 (Nov. 1, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File
[hereinafter Superfund]. Diane Takvorian, Executive Director of the Environmental Health
Coalition, characterized the Integrated Border Plan as "[a]n insult from conception to delivery."
Patrick J. McDonnell, Doubts Voiced About U.S.-Mexico Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1991, at Al.
See also LePage, supra note 14.
47. See, e.g., Superfund, supra note 46.
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for fast-track authority' had signed a letter that calls for a concurrent
environmental agreement addressing the environmental problems which
could arise in the context of free trade with Mexico.49 The proposed
Border Plan does not address the issue of change under free trade and
the proposed free trade agreement does not confront environmental
issues, yet the government is offering both documents as integral
components of a free trade system.'
The Bush administration is attempting to address the issue of
environmental protection in the NAFTA negotiations by referring to the
Border Plan and existing bilateral agreements. On May 1, 1991, the
United States government released the executive response to issues
raised in connection with negotiations&' The Bush administration made
several commitments to protect the environmental laws of the United
States that might be weakened as a result of the trade agreement. 2
Partially influenced by the widespread concern in Congress and the
public sector that NAFTA will significantly weaken United States
regulations, the Bush administration has promulgated several principles
to guide the NAFTA negotiations.
First, the United States will not allow NAFTA to weaken United
States environmental and health laws or regulations Yr Second, the
United States will maintain "existing U.S. pesticide, energy conservation,
toxic waste, [and] health and safety standards," and will continue their
enforcement.' Third, the United States will protect the right of each
party to undertake within its own territory those verification measures
needed to allow "the enforcement of technical regulations and standards
that protect human health and the environment, consistent with
principles of non-discrimination."' Fourth, the United States will
maintain the integrity of its regulatory process, which relies on available
scientific evidence, allows public input, and observes the principle of
48. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
49. Letter from Rep. Ron Wyden and Rep. Richard Gephardt to Carla Hills, U.S. Trade
Representative, cited in Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 214, at A-1 (Nov. 5, 1991). The original letter to
Hills, signed by Sander Levin, Richard Gephardt, Ron Wyden, Donald J. Pease and Jim Moody,
was condensed and sent to President Bush on November 1, 1991, with forty signatures.
50. Environmental groups have noted with concern the complete lack of any mention of
the NAFTA in the Border Plan. Superfund, supra note 46. This caused concern because the
Environmental Review of NAFTA, prepared by the U.S. Trade Representative's Office and the
EPA, relies heavily on the Integrated Border Plan. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra
note 13, at 31-35 (discussing the Border Plan and its goals).
51. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negotiation
of a North American Free Trade Agreement, Transmitted to Congress by the President, May
1, 1991 (on file with author) [hereinafter Administration Response].
52. Id. tab 4, at 9-10.
53. Id. tab 4, at 9.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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nondiscrimination.' Fifth, the United States will protect its right "to
limit trade in items or products controlled by international treaties to
which the U.S. is party .... ,, Sixth, the United States and Mexico will
cooperate in enhancing environmental, health, and safety standards for
products, and will strive to reach a common basis for these standards.
To make this possible, the countries will share scientific and technical
information and will ensure public involvement in the process.' Most
importantly, the United States will protect its right to prevent the
importation of products that do not meet United States "health, safety,
pesticide, food and drug, and environmental regulations."'
The Bush administration, however, has placed qualifications on these
commitments, which render the guarantees vague and open to diverse
interpretations. The government, for example, insists that the regulations
must be based on "sound science,"" a term that is not sufficiently
defined. Furthermore, the regulations cannot arbitrarily discriminate
against imports and cannot constitute a disguised trade barrier.6' These
qualifications, unless they are better defined, may effectively defeat
many standards established by the United States. The executive
response also sets forth a commitment to "work together [with Mexico]
to promote improved enforcement of standards" in connection with
NAFTA.62 It does not, however, contain concrete enforcement
requirements or suggestions of how to fund stepped-up enforcement.
The government's attempt to shore up NAFTA's omission of
environmental provisions by seizing on the Border Plan as an essential
companion measure to NAFTA is unlikely to satisfy critics: the Border
Plan lacks treaty status, enforcement mechanisms, and adequate funding.
Indeed, the Bush administration's Border Plan qualifications cast doubt
on the scope and effectiveness of the government's commitment.
Moreover, the Border Plan addresses only the 100 kilometer stretch of
land on either side of the international dividing line; it does not cover
regions in the interior of Mexico. In the wake of this and in light of the
potentially overwhelming environmental consequences of NAFTA for
both nations, skepticism over the administration's reliance on the Border
Plan is widespread.
56. Id.
57. Id. These conventions include, inter alia, the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243
[hereinafter CITES], and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. See Administration Response,
supra note 51, tab 4, at 10.
58. Administration Response, supra note 51, tab 4, at 10.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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III. POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
Only in the last twenty-five years have industrial and postindustrial
nations acknowledged the need to remediate past environmental damage
and to regulate current operations.' Cleanup and regulation, however,
are costing hundreds of billions of dollars." A national and
international debate rages concerning the value of such measures in light
of the stapering price and the potential for concurrent economic
stagnation.
In light of the high cost of environmental controls, developing
nations disapprove of the attempts by industrialized countries to hold
them to environmental standards that were not observed during the
formation and development of the industrialized world. Nations like
Mexico argue that they cannot afford to abide by rigorous environmental
regulation and should not be expected to attain environmental standards
set by the United States until they have achieved similar economic
success.' This argument notwithstanding, members of Congress,
public interest groups, and a broad cross section of commentators, have
pointed to the environmental consequences of NAFTA and have insisted
that the environmental safeguards imposed in the United States be
observed in Mexico.67
The relegation of environmental concerns to the province of the
Border Plan alone - an agreement limited in scope and with
questionable practical value - highlights the potential dangers of
NAFTA. By neglecting to address environmental issues directly in
NAFTA negotiations, many fear that neither government considers
environmental control as a serious subject that is integral to the
commercial compact.' Environmental criticism of NAFTA is divided
into two broad categories: first, there is concern that a free trade
63. For example, the United States did not pass its first comprehensive piece of
environmental legislation, the National Environmental Policy Act, until 1969. More recently,
the Republic of China has elected to commit billions of dollars to clean up Taiwan. The island
grew prosperous while neglecting environmental protection, and it now seeks to remediate the
destructive consequences of its industrial policy. See Michael Scott Feeley, Reclaiming the
Beautiful Island: Taiwan's Emerging Environmental Regulation, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 907 (1990).
64. Environmental regulation alone costs the United States annually an amount equal to
2 to 2.5 percent of the gross national product. OECD Urges U.S. to Make Greater Use of Market
Mechanisms to Address Problems, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 649, 649 (Dec. 4, 1991).
65. See generally Giinther Handl, Environmental Protection and Development in Third World
Countries: Common Destiny - Common Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 603 (1988)
(arguing that third world development should be maintained, but only with concurrent
management of the risks of industrial pollution).
66. See Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, International Trade, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1992,
at 29.
67. See infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
68. Feeley, supra note 32.
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agreement will increase the number of goods coming into the United
States that are held to different health and safety code standards or
prepared by practices which violate United States policies or laws; and
second, it is feared that NAFTA will translate into increased physical
degradation of Mexico and the United States-Mexican border area.
A. Imported Goods Held to Different Health and Safety Standards
Without adequate provisions, liberalized trade under NAFTCA will
result in an increase of imported goods and foodstuffs into the United
States that are subject to substantially less stringent health and safety
standards than those observed domestically' For example, agricultural
products from Mexico, especially fruits and vegetables, are expected to
flood United States markets under NAFTA. This poses risks to the
health and safety of consumers in the United States for several reasons.
First, in many areas, the fields may be fertilized or irrigated with sewage
and sewage water." Second, pesticide regulations in Mexico are less
stringent and cover fewer substances than those in the United States.'
Third, environmental regulations that do exist are largely unenforced.0
Although the United States has pledged to retain the right to exclude
any product not meeting national health or safety requirements, the
United States might not be able to prevent these goods from, entering the
country. Even when countries are at similar levels of industrialization
and environmental commitment, free trade agreements can result in a
downward harmonization of standards and pressures to justify or
change existing regulations.
This has occurred repeatedly in the context of the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement. 4 United States meat, for example, is
69. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 70.
70. Leslie Kochan, Maquiladoras and Toxics: The Hidden Costs of Production South of
the Border 7 (Feb. 1989) (unpublished pamphlet, on file with author). In Juarez, Mexico, for
example, waste from this city of more than 750,000 bordering El Paso, TX, flows into a canal
used for crop irrigation. Although waste water is not supposed to be used for fertilizer or
irrigation, there is no monitoring of these canals. Id. Furthermore, wells drilled in Juarez to
handle increased water demand are contaminated with bacterial pollution that has seeped from
local drainage ditches. Id.
71. Id. For information regarding the issue of pesticides in food imported into the United
States, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFcE, PESTICIDES: BETTER SAMPLING AND ENFORCEMENT
NEEDED ON IMPORTED FOOD: REPORT TO THE HONORABLE FRANK HORTON, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 23-26 (1986) (giving results of FDA monitoring of imported foods from
Mexico).
72. Kochan, supra note 70, at 7.
73. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, Executive Summary, at 2; Administration
Response, supra note 51, at 9.
74. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1989, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). See
UNITED STATES-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE FINAL LEGAL TEXT OF THE US.-CANADA FREE TRADE
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rejected at the Canadian border at a rate ten times higher than that of
Canadian meat entering the United States; this is due to differences in
safety regulations.' The goal of the United States-Canada Agreement,
however, is to enhance each country's access to the other's markets by
eliminating trade inhibiting import barriers. 6 As a result, Canadian
standards may drop. Under Article 708, for example, Canada and the
United States pledged to harmonize their technical regulations in order
to eliminate those that operate as trade restrictions.' United States
agricultural interests have argued that Canada's "safety assessment" for
pesticides operates as a barrier to United States agricultural goods and,
therefore, should be harmonized with the lower United States
standard.'
Similarly, United States environmental regulations have been
challenged under the United States-Canada Agreement. For example,
Canada has contested the application of the EPA Asbestos Phase-Out
Plan which serves to block products made with asbestos from import
into the United States.' Phase I, which took effect on August 27, 1990,
would have banned the manufacture, importation, and processing of
goods containing asbestos.' Thus, despite the relative similarities
between the levels of regulation in nations such as the United States and
Canada, social and economic pressures under a free trade agreement
frequently compel a downward harmonization of regulatory standards.
This problem may prove even more acute under a free trade agreement
with Mexico.
Because the level of industrialization and environmental commitment
in Mexico is much lower than that in the United States or Canada and
because the potential trade distortions resulting from widely divergent
environmental regulations will be high, the pressures to harmonize
AGREEMENT, THE PROPOSED U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION AcT OF
1988 AND A STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcioN, PURSUANT TO 19 U.S.C. 2112(e)(2), 2212(a),
H.R. DOC. No. 216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) [hereinafter U.S.-Canada FTA].
75. CATO Institute Forum, Fed. News Serv., May 9,1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File [hereinafter CATO Institute].
76. U.S.-Canada FrA, supra note 74, at 8. See also H.R. REP. 816 Part , 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1988).
77. U.S.-Canada FrA, supra note 74, at 30-31.
78. See Cato Institute, supra note 75. A primary example is the dispute over a pesticide,
atachlor, which is banned in Canada but allowed in the U.S. Id.
79. See Warren E. Leary, Appeals Court Strikes down Major Parts of Federal Asbestos Ban, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at A20. The Asbestos Phase-Out Plan has recently been struck down by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the EPA did not consider less-
burdensome alternatives. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 947 F.2d
1201, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1991).
80. EPA Challenges Court Decision Overturning Asbestos Ban, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA)
No. 221, at A-7 (Nov. 15, 1991).
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standards downward to accommodate Mexico's enforcement ability will
be tremendous. A GAIT panel recently concluded, for example, that the
United States embargo on Mexican tuna caught by methods that violate
the Marine Mammal Protection Acte' violates GATT.' In so ruling,
the GATr panel held that GATr requires equal treatment of products
regardless of how they are produced. 3
This conclusion suggests that a country can use trade measures to
protect only its own territorial area, not the area beyond its borders.
Protective measures which might be disallowed under this reasoning
include acts to protect the ocean, biological diversity, whales, elephants,
fisheries, forests, migrating birds, and other endangered species.'M
Moreover, any international treaties applied through national laws that
employ trade measures are implicated as well,' including the Montreal
Protocol'M and CITESY Under this reasoning, the United States could
not remain true to the provisions of GATT and still refuse to allow entry
of goods produced in Mexico using production methods that do not
meet United States health, safety, or environmental standards.
B. Increased Physical Degradation of the United States-Mexico Border
Area
The second major environmental issue under NAFTA concerns the
impact of the expected increase in Mexican industrial and commercial
activity on the United States-Mexico border area. In the review of
United States-Mexico environmental issues, the Bush administration
identified two possible industrial growth scenarios for Mexico and the
border area under NAFTA. Under the first scenario, Mexican exports to
the United States will increase and will translate into one to two percent
annual border area economic growth over the next ten years.' Under
the second scenario, the relative economic advantage of the Mexican
border region over areas in the interior may be considerably less than it
81. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988), as amended 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1407 (West Supp. 1992). The law was enacted in 1972 to protect marine
mammals from activities which unnecessarily endanger them. Included in its provisions are
sections requiring importing countries to provide the U.S. with reasonable proof that tuna being
imported was not harvested using means which result in an average rate of incidental dolphin
kills greater than that allowed by U.S. vessels. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
82. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991) (on file with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative); Jessica Mathews,
Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A-21; Guidelines, supra note 30.
83. Mathews, supra note 82.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Montreal Protocol, supra note 57.
87. CITES, supra note 57.
88. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 66-67.
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is for the current maquiladora system.' This could lead to relatively
more investment in the Mexican interior and to a decrease in the
pressures on the border area environment.' The administration noted,
however, that "[r]egardless of which of the above projections proves to
be most accurate, the number of Mexican pollutant-emitting facilities will
increase; this will prompt Mexican commercial and residential pollutant
increases that will affect the United States and will prompt concomitant
increases in United States sister cities as well."9' Under either
projection, Mexico's increased pollution generation under NAFTA
threatens both nations.'
1. Physical Infrastructure. The NAFTA environmental debate calls into
question how Mexico can address the escalation of the pollution problem
resulting from a free trade agreement when it cannot handle its present
commercial and residential needs in an environmentally sound
manner.' The nation lacks sewage systems, waste disposal facilities,
pollution control equipment, water treatment stations, and other basic
structural com onents, let alone mechanisms to enforce their installation
or proper use. Moreover, residential housing and community facilities
89. Id. at 67-68. But see Former International Trade Commission Chairman Predicts Benefits
of North American Free Trade Agreement on U.S. Border States' Businesses, Bus. Wire, Nov. 25,1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (arguing that increased trade between the U.S. and
Mexico will result in greater industrial demands along the border, such as transportation,
distribution, and warehousing). An increase in demand would cause an influx of businesses
and workers taking advantage of the new opportunities and would place added pressure on
the already over-taxed border area infrastructure.
90. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 69.
91. Id. at 85.
92. Absent NAFTA, border area economic growth is expected to continue at the rate of
5 to 15 percent annually. Id. at 66. Moreover, without NAFTA, the border area environment
will continue to be exploited by other investors, such as the Japanese, who will use the
relatively low tariffs for Mexican-made goods to take advantage of the American market.
Currently, "Japanese and other Asian investors can skirt certain U.S. tariffs by investing in"
maquiladoras along the border. Eduardo Garcia-Aguilar, Asia's Interest in Mexico Overshadowed
by Proposed Free-Trade Accord, Agence France Presse, Nov. 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File. These investors bring in component parts, use low-wage labor to assemble
them, and then import them to the U.S. under a "made in Mexico" label. Id. Due to the
availability of the Mexican workforce, Japanese investment in Mexico has doubled since June
of 1990, reaching $3.2 billion by the end of 1990. Id. Without NAFTA to lock in regulations
relating to the tariff rate for products "made in Mexico" of component parts, the border area
environment most likely will continue to be exploited Under the maquiladora program. See
White House Fact Sheet: Review of Environmental Effects of Free Trade with Mexico Released by the
Office of the Press Secretary, Federal News Serv., Feb. 25,1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File.
93. Mexico is not alone in this regard. Developed nations, including members of the
European Community, frequently maintain inadequate infrastructure and regulatory schemes.
See Michael Scott Feeley et al., W(h)ither Goes the EC Proposed Directive on Civil Liability for Waste,
15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1992).
94. See Diane M. Perry et al., Binational Management of Hazardous Waste: The Maquiladora
Industry at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 14 ENvrL MGMT. 441, 445-46 (1990).
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do not meet the needs of an ever increasing population that is migrating
toward perceived employment opportunities along the border and in
urban areas.95 Waste and trash generated by humans is a formidable
component of the pollution stream. Without this type of infrastructure,
environmental regulation and enforcement are meaningless and have
little practical effect on business operations. On the other hand, a
governmental effort that would require businesses to develop a
community infrastructure as a precondition to operation is antithetical
to the encouragement of commercial activity and economic growth. The
Mexican government can ill afford to mandate such action.
The lack of environmental regulation in Mexico, however, has
created a serious threat to public health. The Rio Grande, for example,
has become an ecological disaster. In Ciudad Juarez, a ditch that feeds
into the Rio Grande carries millions of gallons a day of untreated
household and industrial sewage.' Local residents call it agua negra, or
black watery As it flows through downtown Nuevo Laredo, the river
picks up more sewage until it has a fecal contamination level that is
1,000 times greater than the Texas limit.98 As a result, 90 percent of
adults thirty-five years or older in the shanty towns near San Elizario,
Mexico contract hepatitis sometime during their lifetime.'
Of particular concern to the United States is the reality that pollution
does not respect national borders. Indeed, the generation, storage, and
disposal of contaminants in Mexico, particularly along the 2,000 mile
United States-Mexican border, affects American land, air, and water.
The Nogales Wash, for example, carries so much toxic industrial
pollution and untreated sewage into Arizona that a public health
emergency has been in effect in that state for six months.i04 The source
of much of this pollution in the border area is the well-developed
maquiladora industry.
2. The Maquiladora Industry. A maquiladora is a Mexican processing or
assembly plant that receives raw materials and component parts from a
foreign corporation free of import duties. Workers at the plant then
assemble the goods into finished products to be exported with a tax
levied only on the value added in Mexico. 1 Many United States firms
95. See Pat O'Brien, Young Workers Flock to Maquiladora Plants, BUS. J., July 23, 1990, at 1,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
96. James Garcia, Border River Laden with Wastes, AUSTIN AMERWCAN-STATESMAN, Sept. 29,
1991, at Al.
97. Id.
98. Id. The river's fecal contamination level exceeds 200,000 coliform bacteria per
milliliter. Id.
99. Id. at A17.
100. Robert Suro, Border Boom's Dirty Residue Imperils U.S.-Mexico Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
31,1991, at Al. The incidence of hepatitis in Arizona is twenty times the national average. Id.
101. Silva & Dunn, supra note 6, at 956. The maquiladora program was developed in 1966
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establish maquiladoras in order to avoid high labor and environmental
costs."° The maquiladora system also lures manufacturing firms away
from Asia and into Mexico, where they can take advantage of relaxed
tariffs."° Many Asian firms then set up administrative offices in the
United States to serve as headquarters and distribution centers for the
manufactured goods, a move that creates jobs on the United States side
of the border."°
After petroleum, the maquiladora industry is Mexico's largest source
of foreign exchange, bringing in over $3.5 billion in 1990."05 There are
approximately 1600 maquiladoras located on the Mexican side of the
border area," employing over 450,000 people." As the maquiladora
industry has grown, the expanded industrial activity and the increase in
worker population have placed a significant strain on the border area
infrastructure and the surrounding environment"' 8 According to the
EPA, for example, there are nine United States border communities
currently exceeding one or more United States National Ambient Air
Quality Standards.' There is no current data sufficient to characterize
air quality in the Mexican border area, although monitoring efforts have
begun in some areas.1 Since 65 percent of the maquiladora plants
manufacture electronic materials, transportation equipment, and
to generate employment and has since become Mexico's "foreign exchange flagship." Id.
102. Pamela Constable, Trade-Offs at the Border; Proposed Pact Highlights Debate on U.S. Firms
in Mexico, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 1991, at 2.
103. Kate Callen, Maquiladoras Bring Benefits, Problems, Experts Say, UPI, Oct. 10, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
104. Id.
105. Scott Armstrong, Maquiladoras Mint Plethora of Labor Disputes, CHRIMIAN SC1. MONITOR,
May 21, 1991, at 6.
106. IEP DRAFT, supra note 33, at 1-3; Letter from Stephen D. Benson, Director of Border
Operations, GIZA Geoenvironmental, Inc., to Carolyn Frank, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative 1 (Aug. 12, 1991) (on file with author).
107. Silva & Dunn, supra note 6, at 958.
108. IEP DRAFT, supra note 33, at 1-3. Other problems with the maquiladora program
include employee turnover, cultural differences between employees and management, and the
inability of small companies to obtain financing for maquiladora developments. Silva & Dunn,
supra note 6, at 958.
109. IEP DRAFT, supra note 33, at 111-30. National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) are set by the EPA Administrator for the allowable levels of certain pollutants in the
air. The EPA sets the NAAQS for each pollutant based upon criteria which will allow for an
adequate margin of safety to protect the public health from known or anticipated adverse
effects. Thereafter, the areas of the country that do not achieve these desired levels for one or
more of the pollutants must utilize even more stringent controls in an effort to reduce emissions
to achieve the NAAQS for the specified pollutants. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7409-7410 (West Supp. 1991).
The U.S. border areas currently exceeding NAAQS are: San Diego (ozone, CO) and Imperial
Counties, California (PM-10); El Paso County, Texas (ozone, CO, PM-10); Yuma, Puma, Santa
Cruz, and Cochise counties Arizona (PM-10); and Dona Anci County, New Mexico (PM-10).
IEP DRAFT, supra note 33, at 111-30.
110. IEP DRAFT, supra note 33, at rn-30. Cooperative monitoring efforts have begun in
Ciudad Juarez and El Paso. Id.
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furniture, a major concern in the border area is the emission of volatile
organic compounds."'
Growth in the United States-Mexico border area has also affected
both the availability and the quantity of water supplies in cities along the
border. Most of the larger communities along the border draw their
water from surface supplies such as the Colorado River and the Rio
Grande." Due to industrial contaminants from maquiladoras and
sewage from the communities surrounding them, the surface water in
the border area is often highly contaminated." 3 For example, the New
River, which flows from Mexico into California, shows the presence of
more than 100 industrial chemicals"4 and "contains every disease
known in the western hemisphere.""5
3. Hazardous Waste. Typical hazardous wastes generated by
maquiladoras include "acids, bases, liquids containing heavy metals,
metal-plating wastes, organic solvents, and cyanide wastes." 116
Mexican law requires that hazardous waste generated by maquiladoras
either be exported or "nationalized."" 7 As of 1990, however, there
were only seven recycling centers authorized by SEDUE to manage
hazardous waste."8
The maquiladora program's hazardous waste disposal suffers from
many problems. Of primary concern is the confusiofn over what is
considered to be hazardous by Mexico."9  In addition, disposal of
industrial wastes into the sewer system, sale of hazardous waste drums
to small operators who then dump them in the desert or someone's
backyard,' 0 on site storage of hazardous waste by maquiladoras,2'
111. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 78.
112. Id. at 107. The Texas Water Commission reports that groundwater supplies are
limited in the border area, which leads to an increased competition between agricultural and
municipal interests for a limited amount of surface water. Kochan, supra note 70, at 6.
113. Id. at 6-8.
114. Jane Kay, The "Toxic Dump" that Flows into California, S.F. EXAMINER, June 22,1986, at
7. The New River flows through California's lettuce belt and into the Salton Sea, which is the
state's largest lake. Id.
115. Id.
116. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 123.
117. Nationalization is a process through which the Mexican government decides what
hazardous waste may stay in the country for recycling. Elizabeth C. Rose, Transboundary Harm:
Hazardous Waste Management Problems and Mexico's Maquiladoras, 23 INT'L LAW. 223,228 (1989).
Mexican law allows the "donation" of hazardous wastes to charitable organizations, who then
sell them to recyclers. This option is not, however, meant to apply to maquiladoras, but because
of the lack of tracking of the wastes, it is not known whether this loophole is used to get
around the waste exportation requirements. Kochan, supra note 70, at 5.
118. Patrick J. McDonnell, Border Boom Feeding Hazardous Waste Ills, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1989, at B1. Furthermore, these facilities may not meet U.S. requirements under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1988) [hereinafter RCRA].
119. William Kistner, The Gringo Industrial Connection, S.F. EXAMINER, June 22, 1986, at 1.
120. Joseph LaDou, Deadly Migration: Hazardous Industries' Flight to the Third World, TECH.
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and the sale of recycled hazardous waste drums to Mexican citizens who
then use them to store water for washing and drinking, are sources of
great concern to the United States."n Along the United States-Mexico
border, the problem is highlighted by agitated United States citizens who
feel that they are living in "a virtual cesspool."'23
It is likely that NAFTA will bring a concomitant increase in
everything from population, construction, and manufacturing, to
resource extraction and transportation needs. Without installing
adequate structural and regulatory systems, however, such growth
portends a number of environmental problems, not only along the
border, but in Mexican urban areas and other commercial centers where
manufacturing occurs and where people live. 24
Under any growth scenario, NAFTA will result in increased trade
traffic between the United States and Mexico."z Inevitably, most of the
increase will occur at the border area because of the augmented trade
flow. Increased transnational traffic, including transportation of
dangerous chemicals and hazardous waste, will result in the
exacerbation of the present border area environmental crisis. The
potential increase in transportation of hazardous waste and chemicals is
particularly alarming because the emergency response systems that are
currently in place are not equipped to handle the present level of
traffic.2 ' Moreover, the existing roads, bridges, and other
REV., July, 1991, at 47, 50-51.
121. Jane Juffer, Dump at the Border, THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1988, at 24, 28.
122. Id.
123. Juanita Darling et al., Can Mexico Clean up Its Act?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1991, at Al,
A18. According to U.S. Senator John McCain, at one point in early 1991, raw sewage was
flowing from Nogales, Sonora (Mexico) "right, straight into downtown Nogales, Arizona...
• [aind there were kids, both Mexican and American kids, playing in that raw sewage."
Remarks by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Fed. News Serv., Nov. 14,1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
124. Metropolitan areas throughout Mexico endure terrible environmental conditions that
will grow worse with unregulated industrial activity and failure to provide municipal systems
for the inhabitants. According to official statistics, "some 4.3 billion tons of pollutants are
spread over Mexico City each year." Special Committee Will Tackle Pollution Nightmare in Mexico
City, Agence France Presse, Jan. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File. Of this,
many tons come from natural sources, much of which is dust carrying fecal matter from the
city's vast open sewers and latrines which service over thirty percent of the city's twenty
million people. Mark A. Uhlig, Mexico City's Toxic Residue Worsens Already Filthy Air, N.Y.
TIMES, May 12,1991, at Al, A14. In 1991, the ozone levels exceeded international standards for
290 days of the year. Damien Fraser, Hasty Measures Fail to Lift Mexican Smog, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
8, 1992, at 5.
125. See ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEw, supra note 13, at 84; Statement of Edward K. Stimpson,
Trade and Environment Specialist, National Wildlife Federation, Before the Trade Policy Staff
Committee Office of the United States Trade Representative on the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) Regarding the Environmental Implications of a NAFTA 2 (Aug. 12,1991)
[hereinafter Stimpson Statement].
126. Anne Hazard, Ambassador Says Mexico Committed to Cleaning Border Environmental
Problems, States News Serv., Nov. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
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transportation facilities will not be able to manage any increase in border
area traffic without severe congestion." The increase in the number
of stationary and mobile sources of pollutants guarantees that more
contaminants will be released into the air.
The naquiladora industry currently uses and disposes of large
quantities of chemicals without intensive regulation or monitoring by the
Mexican government. 2 ' Should adequate safety standards and
controls not be implemented and enforced, NAFTA could result in a
significant increase in the use and abuse of toxic chemical substances in
the border area and a resulting threat to human and animal health from
irresponsible handling and disposal of chemicals. Indeed, the increase
in hazardous waste generated by new businesses locating in Mexico
could further tax the border area's limited environmental capacity for
hazardous waste disposal."
Supporters of NAFTA might rely on the fact that the United States
and Mexico are signatories to the Basel Convention, a multinational
agreement that regulates the transboundary shipment of hazardous
wasteY° The purpose of the Basel Convention is to "ensure that [a
country] importing hazardous waste would understand the risks... and
would have the required disposal capacity." 3' The goal is to make
hazardous waste transfers "so costly and difficult that industry will find
it more profitable to cut down on waste production and... recycle what
waste they produce."3 2
According to Mexican Ambassador Gustavi Petricioli, there are roughly 250 million crossings
a year along the 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border. Id. See also ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note
13, at 133-35, 182-83 (describing joint U.S.-Mexican efforts to deal with chemical emergencies
and hazardous materials).
127. The risk of accident involving hazardous waste or chemicals is statistically greater
with increases in transportation of these substances. To address this type of concern, Mexican
Ambassador Petricioli recently indicated that Mexico would be willing to discuss "a joint effort
with the United States to improve the toll road between Hermosilla, Sonora, and Nogales,
Mexico," one of the most heavily utilized trade routes between the United States and Mexico.
Hazard, supra note 126.
128. GAO Official Says No Data Available on Toxic Chemicals from Maquiladoras, Daily Rep.
for Execs. (BNA) No. 39, at A-5 (Feb. 27, 1992).
129. See Kochan, supra note 70, at 6.
130. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, art. 25, 28 I.L.M. 649, 677 (1989)
[hereinafter Basel Convention]. For a detailed treatment of the Basel Convention, see Kathleen
Howard, The Basel Convention: Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, 14 HASTIGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 223 (1990).
131. Blaine Harden, Outcry Grows in Africa over West's Waste-Dumping, WASH. POST, June
22, 1988, at A19.
132. Barbara D. Huntoon, Comment, Emerging Controls on Transfers of Hazardous Waste to
Developing Countries, 21 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 291, 291 (1989) (citing Legislation on Global
Waste Control to Be Proposed by Year's End to Congress, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) No. 161, at
A-7 (Aug. 22, 1989)).
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Toward that end, the Basel Convention purports to restrict
transboundary shipments of hazardous waste by prohibiting some
transfers and placing conditions on others." Parties to the Basel
Convention may not ship hazardous waste to any state "which the
exporting country has reason to believe will not manage the waste in an
environmentally sound manner." "34 Further, any otherwise permissible
waste transfer may only occur if: (1) the exporting state does not have
the technical capacity, facilities, or disposal sites or capacity to dispose
of the waste in an environmentally sound manner; or (2) "the wastes.
. . are required as... raw material for recycling or recovery industries
in the [importing country]."" Thus, the Basel Convention prohibits
export of hazardous waste to Mexico because the United States should
"have reason to believe" that Mexico cannot dispose of hazardous waste
in "an environmentally sound manner."'m
The Basel Convention, however, leaves individual countries to set
policies as to what treatment procedures are practicable and
environmentally sound. 37 Since exporting waste is more cost-effective
than compliance with strict domestic standards," the Convention's
prohibitions allowing shipments to a country as long as it will dispose
of the waste in an "environmentally sound manner" can be very broadly
construed. Thus, although the United States has the technical capacity
to dispose of hazardous waste itself, waste may be exported to Mexico
for recycling or reclamation. The United States continues to ship
hazardous waste to Mexico despite the evidence that Mexico neither
properly disposes of the waste, nor recycles it in a manner consistent
with environmental protection. 39 Under NAFTA, this amount is
expected to increase significantly." Furthermore, the Convention does
133. Id. at 293.
134. Basel Convention, supra note 130, art. 6, 28 I.L.M. at 664. Exports to the Antarctic
Region, to states which are not parties to the Convention, and to states which have prohibited
all imports of hazardous waste are also prohibited. Id. art. 4, 28 I.L.M. at 661.
135. Id. art. 4, 28 LL.M. at 661.
136. Julienne I. Adler, United States' Waste Export Control Program: Burying Our Neighbors
in Garbage, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 885,891 n.45 (1991) (citing The Waste Export Control Act: Hearings
on H.R. 2525 Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizations and the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 42 (1989) (testimony of Francis Spivy-Weber, Director, International Program, and V.
Ann Strickland, Deputy Counsel and Director, Toxics Program, National Audubon Society)).
The United States currently sends approximately ten to twelve percent of its exported waste to
Mexico. Id.
137. Huntoon, supra note 132, at 269.
138. See F. James Handley, Hazardous Waste Exports: A Leak in the System of International
Legal Controls, 19 EWrVL L. REP. 10,171, 10,171-72 (1989).
139. Patrick J. McDonnell, Foreign-Owned Companies Add to Mexico's Pollution, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 1991, at A15.
140. Stimpson Statement, supra note 125, at 5. The Basel Convention applies only to
hazardous wastes that are to be "disposed" of, as defined in Annex IV of the Convention.
Thus, the requirements may not presently apply to hazardous waste exported for reclamation
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not explicitly address hazardous waste generated in Mexico as a result
of in-bond processing by foreign-owned industries. That waste could be
disposed of in Mexico without violating the Convention or the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).141
4. Water Quality. The water 4uality of many surface water bodies in
the border area is atrocious.'  The water flowing into the United
States from Mexico carries diseases, raw sewage, and large quantities of
chemicals." The poor water quality in the border area is due to
industrial emissions and to a lack of sewage facilities for the ever
increasing population on the Mexican side of the border."4 The
increased border area growth expected under NAFTA would result in
an even larger number of people in the area and more industrial
pollution sources."4 Without the infrastructure and treatment facilities
to handle the increased demand for water and sewage treatment,
NAFTA will exacerbate an existing border area drinking water
shortage.'46
The Gulf of Mexico, a valuable natural resource for both the United
States and Mexico and a principle artery of trade, is also suffering under
the current situation. The Gulf currently has 3,000 miles of dead ocean
bottom. 47  In addition, coastal wetlands, which comprise one-half of
Mexico's total wetland and are a habitat for 75 percent of the migrating
water fowl from the United States, are being reduced at a rate of 50
square miles per year.' The increased trade traffic in the Gulf,
or recycling. Even the RCRA reporting regulations do not apply to an entity that is "recycling"
rather than disposing of hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.1-.2, 261.6. Nor does RCRA provide
adequate controls. While RCRA requires that the exporting company notify the EPA and the
importing country of the planned shipment and the type and quantity of waste to be shipped,
42 U.S.C. § 6938(c)-(d), the EPA has no power to stop the shipment if appropriate procedures
are followed. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c). Moreover, RCRA contains no requirement that the disposal
facility meet any particular standard. The EPA is merely required to forward to the importing
government a notice detailing the EPA regulations applicable to the waste and to request such
consent following disclosure of U.S. waste regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d)(1)-(4).
141. Rose, supra note 117, at 231. For a discussion of RCRA and the disposal of hazardous
waste in Mexico, see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
142. Larry Rohter, Canal Project Sets off U.S.-Mexico Clash over Water for Border Regions, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1989, at A3.
143. For example, although testing for industrial contaminants along the Rio Grande in
Texas is "almost nonexistent," there is increasing evidence of severe contamination originating
in Mexico. Further, there is clear evidence of high levels of fecal contaminants in both rivers.
Kochan, supra note 70, at 6.
144. Id.
145. See NRDC Statement, supra note 39, at 4-5.
146. TCPS RESPONSE, supra note 17, at 15.
147. Garry Mauro, Comments on the Negotiation of a North American Free Trade
Agreement I (Aug. 12,1991) (unpublished letter, on file with author) [hereinafter Mauro Letter].
148. Id. at 2.
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expected in the event of a free trade agreement, would result in a higher
risk of tanker accidents than can be handled by either party.4 9
5. Land Degradation. Since NAFTA is expected to result in an increase
in air pollution from more vehicles and industrial emitters, an increase
in soil and water pollution from a larger population, more sewage, more
chemical use, and more hazardous waste generation, many delicate
species of plants and animals will be threatened. Swelling economic
activity may spur the exploitation of Mexico's natural resources and the
elimination of wildlife habitats.-4' Degradation of the land and misuse
of the physical assets of the country is an alarming possibility, especially
in light of past and ongoing practices. Those practices indicate, however,
that the Mexican environmental system may not be sufficient to
adequately address the problems that will arise under NAFTA.
IV. THE MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEM
The Mexican environmental regulatory scheme is under scrutiny to
determine its adequacy in addressing environmental and public health
issues which will mushroom under a free trade regime.' While
Mexico has developed a statutory environmental system and has entered
into several bilateral and multilateral agreeements that govern
transboundary pollution and resource issues, the scope and efficacy of
the Mexican domestic and international environmental system is the
central concern of environmental critics.
A. Mexican National Legislation
Mexican efforts to address the devastating environmental situation
and concomitant health problems began twenty years ago. In 1971, the
Mexican government established the nation's first environmental law
with passage of the Federal Law to Prevent and Control Environmental
Pollution (LFPCCA). Its object was to restore environmental quality
by eliminating the causes of pollution.ss The LFPCCA applied
throughout Mexico and its provisions covered all man-made pollutants
149. Kochan, supra note 70, at 6; Mauro Letter, supra note 147, at 1.
150. Some have argued, for example, that adoption of NAFTA will contribute to increased
United States dependency on fossil fuels. Lori M. Rodgers, What Will a Mexican Trade Agreement
Mean to the U.S. Energy Industry?, 128 PuB. UT. FORT. 35, 35 (1991).
151. UNTE STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAWS, REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS: PRELIMINARY REPORT OF EPA FINDINGS 1 (1991)
[hereinafter EPA FINDINGS].
152. Charles T. Dumars & Salvador Beltran Del Rio, A Survey of the Air and Water Quality
Laws of Mexico, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 787, 789 (1988).
153. Id.
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regardless of their origin and of whether their effects on public health
were direct or indirectI 4
In 1982, the Portillo Administration reformed the LFPCCA by
passing the Federal Law on Environmental Protection (FLEP). 55 The
new law, like the LFPCCA, has the broad objective of ensuring the
protection, improvement, conservation, and restoration of the
environment by controlling the contaminants that affect it."5 No new
implementing regulations were ever established to set standards or
criteria for pollutants under this law, however."5 Consequently, when
the FLEP was enforced, it was done so under the regulations established
in 1971 to implement the LFPCCA.'
In 1983, the Mexican constitution was amended to guarantee that
"every person has the right to protection of his health.""5 9 Article 73
empowers the government to protect public health by protecting the
environment."6 Under this provision, the administration of President
Miguel de la Madrid adopted a comprehensive environmental plan,
known as the National Development Plan (PND) in 1983.6 The PND
stated that the government would pay particular attention to urban areas
and establish a specific action program and standards for environmental
protection."6 2 The de la Madrid government created new positions
charged with implementing and enforcing the existing environmental
laws, including SEDUE, which took over the functions that were
previously vested in various subsecretariats." SEDUE presently acts
as the bureaucratic instrument of federal environmental policy.
These environmental efforts consisted mostly of broad policy
statements and objectives with outdated and impractical implementing
regulations that lacked enforcement support. In 1988, however, the
Mexican government crafted a new general law on the environment
which has great promise. The General Law of Ecological Equilibrium
and Environmental Protection (GLEEEP) gathers prior environmental
regulations in a comprehensive body and sets forth the general policy to
be followed in Mexico.' Currently, the responsibility for
154. Id. The LFPCCA defined pollutants as all substances that when placed in the air,
water, or soil (independently or in combination) alter the characteristics of the environment.
Id.
155. Id. at 790.
156. Id. at 790-91.
157. Id. at 791.
158. Id.
159. GisBERT H. FLANZ & LOUISE MORENO, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 7 (1988). See also Dumars & Del Rio, supra note 152 at 793 n.11 (citing CONSrTUCIOJN
POLmcA DE LOS FSADOS UNDOS MEXICANOS 9 (1985)).
160. MEx. CONST. art. 73, XXIX-G, tit. III, ch. II, § 3.
161. Dumars & Del Rio, supra 152, at 792.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 794.
164. Id. at 812. The basic objectives of the GLEEEP are to: (1) define general principles
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environmental protection in Mexico largely rests with the Secretary of
SEDUE.'" However, as with previous environmental laws, the
GLEEEP assigns responsibility for environmental protection under Title
IV to other agencies.' Indeed, the GLEEEP suffers from the same
overlapping jurisdiction and consequent inaction as did previous
Mexican environmental laws."
Defenders of the Mexican regulatory system and of NAFTA argue
that the GLEEEP provides an effective legal regime for protecting the
environment." If the GLEEEP provisions are implemented and
enforced, the resulting system will compare favorably with that of the
United States. The challenge, then, is to ensure that implementation and
enforcement occur.
B. International Agreements
Transboundary pollution and resource issues are governed by
various agreements between the United States and Mexico. The 1889
International Boundary Convention established the binational
International Boundary Commission, which was renamed the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) in 1944.' The
IBWC consists of one American and one Mexican Engineer-
Commissioner, each of whom heads a national section composed of
engineering and legal advisers.' The IBWC is authorized to enter
agreements relating to the planning, construction, operation, and
maintenance of joint projects on the border area rivers, subject to joint
governmental approval." The IBWC also provides water quality
and establish the instruments for their application; (2) achieve an ecological balance; (3)
preserve, restore, and improve the environment; (4) protect the wilderness, wildlife, and aquatic
flora and fauna; (5) promote rational enjoyment and use of natural resources; (6) promote the
preservation of quality air and control the pollution of the air, water and soil; (7) promote the
cooperation of the federal government, federal entities, states and municipalities; (8) promote
the coordination of the various subagencies and entities of the Federal Public Administration;
and (9) to encourage the participation and responsibility of society in issues of environmental
protection. Id.
165. Id. at 805.
166. Id. at 813.
167. Id. at 813.
168. See EPA FINDINGS, supra note 151, at 3-4.
169. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of Mexico
to Facilitate the Carrying out of the Principles Contained in the Treaty of Nov. 12, 1884, and
to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by Reason of the Changes Which Take Place in the Bed
of the Rio Grande and That of the Colorado River, Mar. 1, 1889, U.S.-Mex., 26 Stat. 1512
[hereinafter 1889 Treaty]; ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 9.
170. Treaty Between the United States of America and Mexico Relating to the Utilization
of the Waters of the Colorado and the Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande from Fort
Quitman Texas to the Gulf of Mexico, Nov. 14, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, 59 Stat. 1219, 1220
[hereinafter 1944 Treaty]; ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 9.
171. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 9.
Spring 1992] ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS OF NAFTA
monitoring and data collection of surface waters and has limited
jurisdiction over ground and surface water." The Water Treaty of
1944 extended the IBWC's authority to address water quality,
conservation, and water use issues and gave the IBWC responsibility for
any border water sanitation measures or works mutually agreed upon
by Mexico and the United States.
The 1983 Border Environmental Agreement, known as the La Paz
Agreement, provides a framework for cooperation between Mexico and
the United States on environmental issues.74 Under the La Paz
Agreement, government authorities are directed to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate sources of air, water, and soil pollution in a 100 kilometer wide
zone along each side of the international border.75 The annexes to the
La Paz Agreement set out the technical standards that are to be
implemented.
In addition to the La Paz Agreement, the United States and Mexico
have entered into several cooperative agreements on the environment
including the 1984 agreement between the Directorate General of Natural
Resources of SEDUE and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service for
Cooperation in the Conservation of Wildlife,76 the 1988 Memorandum
of Understanding Between SEDUE and United States National Park
Service on Cooperation in Management and Protection of National Parks
and Other Protected Natural and Cultural Heritage Sites," and the
1989 Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of
the Environment in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City (Mexico City
Agreement).7 8
Mexico and the United States are signatories to several multilateral
environmental treaties as well. Those include the Basel Convention,'7
the Montreal Protocol, 80 CITES,181 and The Convention for the
172. Id.
173. 1944 Treaty, supra note 170, art. 3, 59 Stat. at 1223; IEP DRAFT, supra note 33, at IV-5.
174. La Paz Agreement, supra note 34.
175. IEP DRAFT, supra note 33, at IV-5; La Paz Agreement, supra note 34, art. 2, 22 I.L.M.
at 254.
176. Robert B. Zoellick, Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Apr.
11, 1991), in DEP'T OF ST. DISPATcH, Apr. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
According to the Senate Treaty Office there is no official source for this agreement as it is an
unofficial agreement between the two agencies.
177. The memorandum is not yet in print. National parks comprise about eighteen percent
of the U.S. land in the border area. Id. at 45. To protect park land and the animal and plant
species that thrive in such areas, the United States and Mexico have entered into a bilateral
agreement to protect and preserve these parks.
178. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment
in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City, Oct. 3, 1989, U.S.-Mex., 29 I.L.M. 25 (1990). In
October, 1989, the United States and Mexico entered into the Mexico City Agreement in which
the parties agreed to cooperate in protecting the environment in the Metropolitan area of
Mexico City. Id. art. 1, 29 I.L.M. at 26.
179. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region."m Moreover, Mexico and the United States are both
contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATI).'
These agreements provide a framework under which environmental
concerns relevant to both the United States and Mexico can be
addressed. Indeed, the two nations are not dealing with each other in
an environmental vacuum. The efficacy of these environmental
agreements, as with any international compact, depends entirely on the
efforts of the parties to enforce the settled terms.
Despite the improvement in Mexico's statutory system and the
existence of these international agreements, the state of the Mexican
environment and of Mexican environmental regulation remains far
behind that of the United States. The achievement of a free trade
agreement will join two nations at vastly different stages of economic
and environmental development. For Mexico to attain its economic
goals, environmental values may have to be sacrificed. For the United
States to secure a reliable trading partner, national standards may have
to be compromised.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Merely tallying the potential dire environmental consequences of
ratification is an incomplete analysis since it neglects half of the equation.
A balanced examination must consider the environmental consequences
of scrapping efforts to arrive at a free trade agreement between the
United States and Mexico. Without NAFTA, for example, an expected
stimulus for development in the interior of Mexico would disappear."'
Mexico would continue to rely on the maquiladora program, with its
inadequate infrastructure and unreliable regulatory enforcement. As the
Mexican population continues to grow rapidly, the government would
likely encourage economic development and job creation at the expense
of environmental considerations. In balancing ecological harm and
health threats against the economic needs of an increasingly
impoverished and restless citizenry, it is likely that the nation would
take measures to employ its people at the expense of the environment.
181. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
182. Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24,1983,22 I.L.M. 227 (1983). The United States and Mexico are
both parties to the Cartagena Convention which requires parties to promote contingency plans
for combating oil pollution. Currently, the parties are negotiating a potential annex to the
Convention which would cover hazardous substances and land based sources of pollution. ]EP
DRAFT, supra note 33, at IV-8.
183. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,1947,62 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATTI].
184. Cf. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 69.
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Moreover, Mexico would lose incentives to cooperate with the United
States on the border area pollution problems affecting both nations.
A prosperous Mexico, on the other hand, is in the United States'
interest. NAFTA would generate significant revenues which Mexico
could use to finance infrastructure improvements, technological and
scientific pollution control strategies, efficient resource management, and
better regulatory enforcement. In addition, NAFTA offers a unique
opportunity to bargain for the resolution of environmental issues of great
consequence to the United States and Mexico. The United States would
have the leverage needed to gain significant advances in regulation and
enforcement south of the border, but these bargaining chips have value
only in the context of establishing an improved economic matrix for
Mexico. Outside of free trade negotiations, Mexico has little incentive to
pursue environmental reform.
As the chorus of environmental criticism grows louder," a variety
of proposals have arisen to address the prophesied environmental
consequences. To approach the problem comprehensively will require
establishing a structure that involves all three North American countries
and that facilitates the process of harmonizing and setting environmental
regulations and standards, the designation and empowerment of specific
entities or persons to make, implement, and enforce regulatory decisions,
along with measures for resolving disputes, and the funding of these
efforts.
A. Harmonization
Harmonization of environmental standards and enforcement bedevils
economic blocks, countries, states, and localities. Regulations and
priorities frequently differ based on the peculiar history, culture, and
experience of each player. The essential concern from the United States'
perspective is whether its standards will be unacceptably compromised
by attempting to reach an agreement with Mexico;"8 Mexico is
concerned that the United States will attempt to impose unreasonable
and unrealistic requirements on a country not able to bear such
strictures.87
With the adoption of GLEEEP and the promulgation of specific
standards and implementing regulations, Mexico has made significant
progress toward a comprehensive environmental regulatory scheme.'
185. Harry Bernstein, Opposition to Free-Trade Pact Growvs, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at D3.
186. Administration Response, supra note 51, tab 4, at 10.
187. LePage, supra note 14, at 3.
188. Pursuant to the GLEEEP mandate, Mexico has adopted regulations for environmental
impact assessment for major governmental or commercial projects, solid waste management,
air pollution control, and automobile emissions in Mexico City. Further, additional regulations
are forthcoming for water pollution control and hazardous waste transportation. NRDC
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However, current Mexican environmental compliance requirements fall
short of similar laws in the United States.89 The Natural Resources
Defense Council (NRDC), for example, has criticized Mexico for lacking
"cradle to grave" regulation of hazardous wastes like that of RCRA,'A
public reporting for industrial emissions such as United States
"community right to know" provisions,' 9' and mandatory examination
of alternative actions and provision for public comment concerning
projects which will impact the environment such as the National
Environmental Policy Act.92
In contrast, Mexican government documents and reports generally
are available to the citizenry only at the discretion of government
officials." There are no "community right-to-know" laws which allow
community officials and citizens to monitor environmental compliance
by industry in their community.'94 Moreover, although the GLEEEP
contains a "denouncement" provision, which allows private citizens to
indicate the need for enforcement action against industry, this has been
"virtually ineffective due to the lack of an independent judiciary in
Mexico for follow up if SEDUE fails to act."' The United States
perspective dictates that Mexican standards must rise to the level of
United States laws.
Indeed, for many, harmonization means adoption of the United
States democratic approach to environmental decision making.196
Toward that end, one solution to the problem of inadequate Mexican
enforcement resources is for that nation to allow public participation in
environmental policymaking and to encourage public monitoring of
pollution generators and SEDUE enforcement efforts. Moreover, many
commentators assert that Mexico should adopt United States standing
jurisprudence and allow Mexican citizens to bring complaints against
industries for nonconformity with Mexican environmental laws.' 97
Statement, supra note 39, at 9.
189. See Judy Pasternak, Firms Find a Haven from U.S. Environmental Rules, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
19, 1991, at Al, A24.
190. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C.
11,001-11,050 (1988).
192. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988) [hereinafter NEPA].
193. TCPS RESPONSE, supra note 17, at 10.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 11 n.19.
196. President Announces Three-Year Program to Clean Up, Prevent Pollution at Mexican Border,
22 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 2427, 2428 (1992).
197. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt intends to introduce legislation that would
allow stockholders to sue U.S. companies operating in Mexico for failure to comply with
Mexican environmental laws. Katie Hickox, Gephardt Plans to Introduce Legislation Allowing
Stockholders to Sue, States News Serv., Sept. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
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Private attorney general provisions might spur even greater
compliance. 9'
The predicate of this line of reasoning is that Mexico is incapable of
establishing its own environmental regime wholly independent of, but
on par with, United States environmental standards. Mexico's historic
antipathy toward the United States' attempts to control Mexico's internal
policies, combined with the practical reality of the vastly disparate
economic and environmental levels of the two countries, might render
any effort to compel Mexico rapidly to adopt American standards
offensive and counterproductive. On the other hand, harmonization
provisions which do not dictate a reliance on United States standards,
but which merely require that the nations must work toward pollution
levels that are protective of public health and safety, could mean United
States laws would be diluted.'" A middle-road must be forged.
Toward that end, an upward harmonization of environmental standards
between the two nations could be implemented to establish a more
gradual process of standard setting and phase-in, while maintaining the
rights of state and local governments to set higher standards should it
prove politically or economically feasible.2' This type of graduated
harmonization may be encouraged through a variety of measures.
Regulatory oversight will be supported and encouraged by sharing
and assistance in technological development, bilateral aid from the
United States and Canada, and multilateral development loans targeted
at better implementation and enforcement of existing regulations. In
addition, adoption of concrete trade sanctions can be employed when a
country fails to implement or enforce environmental standards. Finally,
the organization of a system for monitoring environmental compliance
under NAFTA can be installed to trigger the enforcement measures.20'
Not only might these proposals ensure that standards would be
harmonized, implemented, and enforced, but they could establish a
framework under which future environmental improvements could be
launched.
198. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 505, 13 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988).
199. Letter from Mont P. Hoyt, Esq., to Carolyn Frank, Trade Policy Staff Committee,
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2 (Aug. 10,1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hoyt
Letter]. In connection with a recent resolution stating that Congress will not approve enabling
legislation for GATT's Uruguay Round or NAFTA if the agreements jeopardize certain U.S.
laws, Representative Henry Waxman (D-Cal) indicated that he was troubled by draft GATT
rules relating to international harmonization because they could be used to bring countries
down to the lowest common denominator. Waxman Measure Urges Administration to Safeguard
U.S. Laws in GATT, FTA, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1740 (Nov. 27, 1991) [hereinafter
Safeguard]. For the text of the Waxman resolution, see H.R.J. Res. 264, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991) [hereinafter Waxman Resolution].
200. Hoyt Letter, supra note 199, at 2.
201. Id.
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B. Enforcement
The first step to an effective bilateral environmental agreement is to
develop a process for regulatory harmonization and standard setting.
The next step is to give real authority to entities charged with
implementing and enforcing those harmonized regulations. The
enormity of the challenge requires dramatically increased personnel,
greater resources, and a sincere commitment from the Mexican and
United States governments. Furthermore, authority needs to be clearly
delineated, respected, and employed. Under the existing regime, the
implementation and enforcement authority of SEDUE, EPA, and IBWC
should be strengthened and augmented to provide for a comprehensive
response framework from which the pollution control measures already
in place could be enforced in a meaningful way. For border area
concerns, the United States and Mexico have cooperative agreements in
place.' Further, the 1983 La Paz Agreement authorizes SEDUE and
EPA to take joint action on air, water, and land pollution in the border
region.' In practice, however, action under this plan has been sparse
and often less than adequate. For example, both agencies "admit to
having little control over the disposal of hazardous wastes generated by
the maquiladora plants."2  Similarly, the IBWC, which is charged
with carrying out binational sanitation and water conservation measures,
suffers from lack of progress on issues of surface water salinization and
sanitation.2' To enhance cooperative enforcement capability, the
United States and Mexico recently created the Cooperative Enforcement
Working Group. °' The objectives of the group are laudable, but the
projects are not mandatory and cannot be enforced, particularly in light
of the lack of funding. The efficacy of such a venture, then, is doubtful.
202. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
204. NRDC Statement, supra note 39, at 10-11.
205. Mark A. Sinclair, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement Between Mexico and the
United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the Borderland, 19 CORNELL INTL L.J. 87, 103
n.76 (1986).
206. ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 32, 43. Specific points to be addressed by
the Cooperative Enforcement Strategy Working Group include:
information exchange relevant to transboundary pollution and related enforcement
efforts; exploring the development of compatible computer software to facilitate
[information exchange]; enhancing . . . enforcement capabilities at key border
crossings . .. enhancing training efforts for inspectors and other enforcement
personnel; facilitating personnel exchanges to share enforcement experiences and
techniques; sharing... laboratory and other technical enforcement support services;
and expanding cooperative interaction in the form of joint observer visits to facilities
in each country's border area.
Id. at 32.
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Instead of relying only on SEDUE and EPA, a new supranational
entity could be established to police the efforts of the designated entities.
The NRDC, for example, advocates the creation of a North American
Commission on Trade and the Environment with a comprehensive
mandate to address problems related to NAFTA throughout the trade
region. It will also rectify the current institutional shortcomings which
tend to hamper implementation and enforcement of existing
environmental laws. 07 The commission would be composed of
governmental and nongovernmental experts on trade and the
environment from the United States, Mexico, and Canada.' It would
be authorized to hear complaints from governments, nongovernmental
organizations, and citizens in connection with the failure of any
signatory to enforce its own environmental standards or applicable
international norms on activities related to trade.2' Moreover, the
commission could be empowered to investigate allegations of poor
enforcement and to make recommendations to the parties on required
enforcement actions.210
Perhaps an even more effective enforcement tool would be a
commission with powers akin to those of the GATT decision panel.2 '
This commission could not only review enforcement, but could make
decisions about NAFTA environmental compliance. Finally, such a
commission could serve the important purpose of highlighting problem
areas and could be vested with power to enjoin polluting activities that
were violating applicable standards.2 2
Enforcement commissions notwithstanding, disputes will inevitably
arise between the United States and Mexico regarding environmental
and trade measures,' and it is necessary to establish procedures to
resolve these disagreements. There are several principles which should
guide the creation of any dispute resolution mechanisms negotiated as
part of NAFrA. 4 The agreement should contain an explicit provision
stating that legitimate environmental policy measures will be free from
attack as illegal trade barriers. For example, the concerns raised by
207. NRDC Statement, supra note 39, at 11. The NRDC's proposal for a North American
Trade Commission is similar to Mont Hoyt's suggestion for a dispute resolution panel that
would operate like the GATr panel, but would have a broader base of expertise and operate
openly.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See generally GATr, supra note 183, art. XXIII, 61 Stat. at A64-A65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 267-
68 (setting forth international dispute resolution procedures).
212. See NRDC Statement, supra note 39, at 11-12.
213. Hoyt Letter, supra note 199, at 3.
214. Id.
215. Id. NAFrA should provide that when determining the legitimacy of a particular
environmental regulation or standard, the burden of persuasion should be upon the party
challenging it as a trade barrier. Moreover, the "sound science" objection should be very
290 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
the GATT tuna decision must be addressed directly to avoid the
weakening or invalidation of existing United States health and safety
standards.16
Additional unilateral measures under consideration in the United
States include treating lesser standards in other countries as unfair trade
subsidies. Senator David Boren introduced a bill entitled the
International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991 (IPDA), 7 which is
currently pending before the Senate Finance Committee. The main
purpose of the IPDA is to require manufacturers of imported goods to
comply with reasonable environmental standards or to pay a duty
representing a portion of the cost that would have been added to the
imported items had reasonable environmental regulations been followed
during the manufacturing process."8  Essentially, the IPDA would
bring the price of imported items in line with the price of similar items
manufactured in the United States under EPA environmental standards.
"The failure to impose and enforce effective pollution controls and
environmental safeguards" would be considered "a bounty or grant" to
the industry by its government.219 Thus, the IPDA would treat
government failure to require and enforce environmental standards as
a subsidy to the uncontrolled industry.
Under Boren's plan, the amount of duty imposed by the United
States on products manufactured without reasonable pollution controls
would be "the cost which would have to be incurred by the
manufacturer... of the foreign... merchandise to comply with the
environmental standards imposed on United States producers of the
same class or kind of merchandise.""2 One half of the funds collected
carefully circumscribed to prevent a party from challenging environmental standards which are
established to protect human health but which may or may not be based upon concrete
scientific research results. See id. at 3-4.
216. In response to the GATT Panel's ruling on the tuna embargo, Representative Henry
Waxman, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, and twenty-one co-sponsors, including House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt,
introduced a resolution on November 21, 1991, stating that Congress would not approve
enabling legislation for the free trade agreement with Mexico and the Uruguay Round of GAIT,
if either of the agreements jeopardizes U.S. health, safety, environmental, or labor laws. In
order to address the potential dilution of U.S. laws under GATr or NAFTA that interprets
protective U.S. laws as disguised trade barriers, the Waxman resolution asks the administration
to complete negotiations to make GATr compatible with U.S. laws, including the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and the Clean Air Act.
Waxman Resolution, supra note 211. If this does not occur, the resolution states that Congress
will not approve legislation to implement any trade agreement. Id. The resolution is backed
by a coalition of labor unions, and environmental, consumer, and agricultural groups.
Safeguard, supra note 199, at 1740.
217. S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Boren Bill].
218. International Pollution Deterrence Act Introduced to Balance Market Competition, Int'l Env't
Daily (BNA) (May 14, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAENV File.
219. Boren Bill, supra note 217, § 3(a).
220. Id. § 3(b)(C).
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as a duty on the import of unregulated goods would be used to fund a
"Pollution Control Equipment Export Fund" to "assist purchases of U.S.
pollution control equipment by developing countries.""' The other
half of the money collected would be used to fund a "Pollution Control
Research & Development Fund".' The administrator of the EPA
would establish this fund "to provide assistance for U.S. companies in
the research and development of pollution control technology and
equipment." '
Despite the bill's clear philosophical foundation, Boren's proposal is
fraught with complexity. Indeed, application of the bill's measures
would almost certainly induce retaliation from other nations.'
Nonetheless, the Boren Bill is receiving wide-spread attention2  and
appears to be thriving amidst the current American sentiment against
restrictive trade practices abroad. It is unclear if the measure will be
passed, but the seriousness with which the measure is being received
testifies to the gravity of the issue.
Another, more radical, unilateral approach to augment enforcement
is to ask Mexico to grant United States governmental entities limited
jurisdiction over United States operations located south of the border.
One way to do this would be to pass domestic legislation mandating
compliance with United States environmental laws for United States
companies operating abroad. Alternatively, the administration could
provide for this in NAFTA by imposing sanctions on parent companies
based in the United States in lieu of closing plants based in Mexico or
requiring clean-up in Mexico. Under such an agreement, the EPA could
enforce United States pollution control laws on United States businesses
operating in Mexico. Applicable environmental standards are already
in place in the United States, as are the sanctions and the technology
necessary to ensure compliance. 26 Under this approach, the United
States could circumvent the difficulties inherent in imposing stricter
pollution control standards on Mexico as a prerequisite to NAFTA.
221. Id. § 4(d).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Kyle E. McSlarrow, International Trade and the Environment: Building a Framework for
Conflict Resolution, 21 ENVTL L. REP. 10,589, 10,592 (1991).
225. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, Environment Rules Set Stagefor GATT Conflicts, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
5, 1991, at 6 (detailing debate and tesitmony over Boren Bill).
226. The United States has in place comprehensive legislation for various facets of the
problem of environmental pollution. See, e.g., NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (requiring
preparation of an impact statement for government projects that impact the environment);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (1988); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (detailing hazardous waste disposal and clean-up
requirements); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671 (West Supp. 1991) (regulating discharges
that impact ambient air quality); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988) (controlling the release of chemical pollutants into the nation's water).
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Further, the United States could avoid concern over whether or not the
standards would be enforced by Mexican authorities.
An obvious difficulty in securing such a provision would be the
infringement on Mexico's inherent sovereignty by allowing the United
States to enforce its environmental standards against United States
companies in Mexico (assuming the nationality of a company could be
determined).' Mexico would have to agree to allow United States
officials to monitor emissions and to make plant inspections in Mexico.
It would also have to agree to permit United States officials to sanction
companies based in Mexico in ways which would severely impact
Mexico's internal control.' Further, plant closing or CERCLA type
clean-up operations would obviously impact Mexican citizens and the
Mexican economy.
Additionally, while this plan may solve the problem of United States
companies polluting in Mexico, it does not address the issue of other
foreign companies that locate in Mexico to take advantage of the low
environmental compliance costs there39 The plan would also leave
Mexican companies free to pollute in order to better compete against
enterprises from the north. Indeed, Mexico would lose a core element
of its attractiveness to United States business investment if the businesses
were subject to the same regulations as applied in the United States.
Without uniform environmental controls, Mexican business might do
better, but Mexico would not.
In the final analysis, enforcement is very likely to reduce Mexico's
ability and incentive to monitor actions and implement acceptable
regulations. If the desire or resources to ensure regulatory enforcement
are lacking, no amount of United States pressure will improve the
environmental situation. The key to adequate enforcement lies in
establishing an infrastructure to properly accommodate commercial and
residential activities and in developing the personnel and expertise to
ensure compliance with reasonable environmental regulations. To
accomplish this herculean task would require substantial funding.
C. Funding
Lack of funding is the root of Mexican and United States
environmental concerns. The United States spends hundreds of billions
of dollars each year to protect and remediate the environment.23 The
227. See Robert E. Lutz, The Export of Danger: A View front the Developed World, 20 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL 629, 638-39 (1988).
228. For example, some U.S. environmental laws could not be enforced in Mexico without
considerable economic impact on Mexican citizens.
229. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
230. For example, the Bush administration has recently requested $100 million for
environmental projects at the U.S.-Mexican border. Douglas Jehl & Rudy Abramson, Bush to
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cost of these efforts contributes to the difficult economic climate in many
parts of the country and across many industries." SEDUE's 1990
operating budget for pollution control activities in all of Mexico, in
contrast, amounted to only six percent of the water pollution and
hazardous waste budget for Texas alone. 2 At present, Mexico is not
realistically able to devote major resources to environmental protection
by developing the necessary infrastructure and by hiring and training
personnel. In addition, SEDUE is in constant competition for limited
funds with immediate concerns such as housing, food assistance, and
other domestic programs that seek to address Mexico's chronic poverty
and urban overcrowding. 3  Consequently, the department is limited
politically in its ability to lobby for needed appropriations. Because an
effective environmental plan for NAFTA must include concrete sources
of funding, ensuring that money is channeled into environmental
protection becomes a major concern for the proponents of a trade
agreeement.
A variety of methods for raising capital are under discussion. The
Bush administration and others have asserted that the increased
prosperity brought by NAFTA will help Mexico solve its funding
problems.' To the extent that NAFTA could alleviate some of the
constraints on Mexico's budget caused by persistent poverty and an
enormous foreign debt,23 it could free up some funds for
environmental protection. However, the concern that Mexico, in its
struggle to compete with more efficient Canadian and United States
companies, would not enforce its own environmental laws, is very real
in light of the present state of the maquiladoras in the border area.2
Better economic times and increased pressure from the United States
under a free trade agreement, however, could generate more revenues,
a percentage of which could be mandated for environmental protection.
Another mechanism for providing funding is to tap foreign investors
taking advantage of the free trade zone. 7 Foreign investors could be
Seek $100 Million Extra for Border Cleanup, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at Al.
231. See generally Marshall Ingwerson, Regulation Questions Divide White House, CHRISTIAN
ScI. MONTrOR, Dec. 31, 1991, at 7 (describing costs of U.S. environmental regulations).
232. TCPS RESPONSE, supra note 17, at 9.
233. See NRDC Statement, supra note 39, at 13.
234. Administration Response, supra note 51, tab 4, at 1. Mary Kelly of the Texas Center
for Policy Studies notes that the administration, in trying to overcome Mexico's "glaring lack
of any significant resources to devote to environmental protection," argues that "(1) growth
under the free trade agreement will provide the revenues necessary for enforcement and (2) the
World Bank is about to loan Mexico $84 million to SEDUE." TCPS RESPONSE, supra note 17, at
9.
235. Mexico's foreign debt reached $100 billion in 1989. Janet Duncan, Mexican Rate Slump
Good News for Some Investors, Reuters, Mar. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File.
236. See Hoyt Letter, supra note 199, at 2.
237. Id. at 3.
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held responsible for financing measures necessary to mitigate or prevent
the environmental effects of their activities. Under current forecasts of
foreign investment following NAFTA, a one percent levy on all foreign
direct investment would generate an annual amount of about
$70 million.' For the levy to be an effective way to aid pollution
prevention efforts, however, would require agreement within the
negotiations upon how these funds would be allocated. 9
Similarly, NAFTA could provide that a certain percentage of the
value of goods exported under NAFTA must be allocated to pollution
control implementation and enforcement. As suggested by Senator
Boren, the United States and Canada could impose countervailing duties
on goods not produced in compliance with reasonable pollution control
standards.2' This would provide an incentive for businesses to
comply or funnel non-complying profits back into environmental
protection. Likewise, creative programs to discourage pollution
generation could be negotiated such as an agreement to allow
international emission offsets issued by the United States Trade
Representative's staff.24' Under this type of program, a facility in the
United States border region could buy emission credits from an existing
facility in Mexico which might be switching to a cleaner fuel or reducing
its emissions. These emission credits would be used to offset the
increase in pollutant emissions in the United States and to permit new
plant construction in Mexico under the United States requirements.242
This could result in lower overall emissions by distributing the right to
pollute only to facilities that derive the most benefit from the activity.
Another proposed means of funding and managing the clean up of
the border area is the creation of the trinational superfund that has been
advocated by Economic Strategy Institute Fellow, Robert Cohen.
243
According to Cohen, such an arrangement would be "dedicated to
enhancing Mexican regulatory capabilities and [to cleaning up] border
zone pollution ... ,2 A trinational superfund "would be supported
by initial contributions from North American governments, assessments
on companies that pollute the border zone, and by Mexican purchases
of outstanding Mexican debt [that would be] treated as special face value
contributions to the fund... ,245 Indeed, the superfund would
238. Id.
239. TCPS RESPONSE, supra note 17, at 10.
240. See Boren Bill, supra note 217.
241. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 104.
242. Id.
243. Economist Proposes that NAFTA Include Trinational Superfund for Environment, Int'l Bus.
Daily (BNA) (Nov. 1, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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operate much like CERCLA.24 Funds would be available for cleanup
of polluted areas, and the fund officials would have "inspection powers
and the authority to impose fines for past pollution."247 The fund's
trinational support would enable a board of inspectors to oversee
operations on both sides of the border and to cut off aid and trade
benefits to any nation failing to meet specified goals for waste treatment
and pollution control.2'
Traditional sources of funding could be put in place under NAFTA.
The free trade agreement might provide for the furnishing of multi-
lateral development loans, increased bilateral aid, contributions from
private industry, and cancellation or reallocation of debt to be reinvested
in environmental planning and regulatory efforts.249 NAFTA might
also establish a "Development Bank funded by debt reallocation...
contributions from U.S. industry investing in Mexico and other sources"
to deal with the lack of environmental regulation and the lack of an
adequate infrastructure.' With the stakes so high, there is a great
need for creative measures. Trickle down environmental construction
and enforcement will not occur naturally or adequately to address a
systemic problem of this magnitude. Thus, it is vital that an
environmental funding structure be mandated as an integral part of a
free trade agreement.
VI. CONCLUSION
Together, Mexico and the United States are facing a global
marketplace radically altered by new economic factors. Although
occupying the same land mass, each nation is a product of very different
historical and cultural experiences. As Mexican Nobel Prize winner
Octavio Paz has observed, Mexico and the United States are "two
distinct versions of Western civilization." z' The goal of NAFTA is to
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. TCPS RESPONSE, supra note 17, at 6.
250. Id.
251. OcTAvIO PAZ, Mexico and the United States, in THE LABYRINTH OF SOLITUDE 357, 357
(Rachel Phillips Belash trans., 1985).
Our countries are neighbors, condemned to live alongside each other; they are
separated, however, more by profound social, economic, and psychic differences than
by physical and political frontiers. These differences are self-evident, and a
superficial glance might reduce them to the well-known opposition between
development and underdevelopment, wealth and poverty, power and weakness,
domination and dependence. But the really fundamental difference is an invisible
one, and in addition it is perhaps insuperable. To prove that it has nothing to do
with economics or political power, we have only to imagine a Mexico suddenly
turned into a prosperous, mighty country, a superpower like the United States. Far
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ally these fundamentally different countries for the common purpose of
mutual economic prosperity; the challenge is to accomplish this objective
without precipitating disastrous environmental consequences. While the
United States cannot compromise its health standards, Mexico cannot
adopt instantly the United States' environmental regime. Indeed, a
recognition of the different perspectives of the two countries is essential.
The disparity, however, does not justify ignoring environmental issues.
Rather, a framework to facilitate regulatory harmonization, enforcement,
and funding is essential to creating a North American free trade zone
that will allow the continent to compete vigorously in the new world
marketplace. NAFrA provides the opportunity for, and in many ways
necessitates the creation of, such a structure. The agreement, however,
must navigate between the scylla of long-term environmental demands
and the charybdis of contemporary global economic pressures to reach
an effective and reasonable process for addressing the environmental
issues that are vital to both nations.
from disappearing, the difference would become more acute and more clear-cut. The
reason is obvious: We are two distinct versions of Western civilization.
